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Abstract
Besley (1988) is one of the few exceptional articles containing non−welfarist optimal tax
devices. Feehan (1990) reports an error in his first−best rules. The present note argues that
Besley's second−best rules optimize the welfare of phantom agents rather than the corrected
welfare of real existing agents in society.
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Slowly, but resolutely, normative economists were convicted that they should abandon
the welfarist framework to be able to give a less narrow-minded account and a more
inspired justiﬁcation for their devices on optimal taxes or tax reforms. However, in prac-
tice, much less optimal tax rules are available for ‘non-welfare’ economists, compared to
the by now almost innumerable amount of welfarist devices. The whole battery of ana-
lytical tools developed by consumer theory –mainly Roy’s identity– is, by deﬁnition,
no longer available to the non-welfarist normative economist. As a consequence, it be-
comes more diﬃcult to interpret the ﬁrst-order conditions; we call this the non-welfarist
interpretation problem.
A more modest approach starts from the old Musgravian idea to discriminate between
ordinary goods and (de)merit goods. Tobacco is the most famous example. People
enjoy smoking, but in the end you will get lung cancer (with a certain probability
which is quite high). So, smoking a cigarette would give you much less utility as what
you might think at ﬁrst sight. Rather than using the agent’s utility to measure social
welfare, Besley (1988) proposes to use ‘corrected’ utilities via a scaling factor applied
to (de)merit goods.1 For example, “government might treat ten cigarettes by its system
of value as equivalent to what the individual smoking those cigarettes would regard to be
twenty” (Besley, 1988, p. 374), which corresponds with a scaling factor equal to one half
for cigarettes. Unfortunately, Besley’s second-best rules do not optimize the ‘corrected’
welfare of real existing agents in society, but optimize the welfare of phantom agents:
the agents with the ‘correct’ behaviour according to government.
To ﬁx ideas, we present the problem within the framework of a single agent economy. The
next section presents two diﬀerent welfare functions, the ‘corrected’ rule and Besley’s
objective. In a third section, we show that within the class of CES utility functions, both
rules (and the optimal tax formulas) coincide if and only if one uses a Cobb-Douglas
preference speciﬁcation.
2. Two diﬀerent welfare functions
Consider an agent with a well-behaved2 utility function
u :( x,y)  → u(x,y), (1)
deﬁned over (i) non-merit goods x =( x1,...,x K) ∈ RK
+ with prices p =( p1,...,p K) ∈
RK
++ and (ii) a single (de)merit good y ∈ R+ with price q ∈ R++. Given an income m,
the parametric demand system, denoted (x(p,q,m),y(p,q,m)), follows from solving
max
x,y u(x,y) s.t. px
 
+ qy ≤ m. (2)
1For a critique on and an alternative for Besley’s scaling approach, see Schroyen (2002). For a
diﬀerent approach which models (de)merit goods as externalities, see Pazner (1972), and Decoster and
Schokkaert (1989) for an empirical application.
2By this, we mean smooth, strictly increasing and strongly quasi-concave.
1Besley (1988) gives a clear description of the (de)merit good argument:
We accept an essentially Utilitarian framework whilst permitting the social planner to recog-
nize that the preferences used to determine consumption may be a ‘faulty’ representation of
well-being. It is this divergence upon which we pin our merit good arguments. (Besley, 1988,
p. 372)
The analysis is premised on the idea that a social planner, or politician, ‘knows best’ but
chooses to correct individual preferences in a very speciﬁc way, i.e. via altering the valuation
of merit goods alone. There is no violation of individual preference orderings beyond this.
(Besley, 1988, p. 382)
Besley’s model is based explicitly on the fact that agents’ preferences are defective in
judging their own well-being when choosing quantities of the merit good y. Besley seems
only interested in correcting the agents’ valuation of well-being towards its true well-
being. He proposes to rescale the original amount of the (de)merit good of the agent
by a scalar θ so that the ‘correct’ utility generating potential of a quantity y of the
(de)merit good equals θy. The good is a merit good for this agent (i.e. it has a higher
utility generating potential than originally thought by our agent) if θ > 1 and a demerit
good if 0 < θ < 1. The ‘correct’ valuation function of our agent is deﬁned as:
u :( x,y)  → u(x,y) ≡ u(x,θy). (3)
The ‘corrected’ (indirect) social welfare equals
W (p,q,m;θ) ≡ u(x(p,q,m),θy(p,q,m)). (4)
The speciﬁcation in (4) corresponds with Besley’s description. However, his formal
speciﬁcation diﬀers from it. The ‘correct’ valuation function in (3) not only gives the
true well-being when consuming (x,y), but it can also be used to describe the be-
haviour of a phantom agent, who has the ‘correct’ behaviour for our agent according
to the social planner. The parametric demand system of the phantom agent, denoted
(x(p,q,m),y(p,q,m)),t e l l su sw h a t“the individual would choose for himself if he had
the ‘correct’ preferences” (Besley, 1988, p. 378). Thus, it follows from solving
max
x,y u(x,y) s.t. px
 
+ qy ≤ m. (5)
As mentioned in Besley, the solution of (5) is related to the solution of (2), because the



















Besley’s (indirect) social welfare (Besley, 1988, equation 4.1, p. 377) is deﬁned as

















where the equality follows from (6).
Compare Besley’s speciﬁcation at the right-hand side of (7) with the ‘corrected’ speciﬁ-
cation in (4). In contrast with the ‘corrected’ version, Besley goes one step too far: his
version looks at the quantities consumed by the phantoms, rather than by the existing
agents.
23. Application to the CES-family of preferences
Because the approaches in (4) and (7) are diﬀerent, they will lead to diﬀerent tax
recommendations in general. In the special case of Cobb-Douglas preferences, however,
u(x,θy) is a monotonic transformation of u(x,y) so they both yield identical demand
functions, which forces (4) and (7) to coincide. Somewhat stronger, within the class of
CES utility functions, the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁcation is the only one for which Besley’s
approach coincides with the ‘corrected’ approach:
Claim. Consider the class of CES utility functions, deﬁned as















with 0 < σ < ∞, the elasticity of substitution, and parameters α1,...,αK,αy ∈ R++.I f
θ  =1 , then Besley’s speciﬁcation in (7) is the same as the ‘corrected’ speciﬁcation in
(4) if and only if our agent has Cobb-Douglas preferences (lim
σ→1
uσ).
Proof. For a given θ ∈ R++,w i t hθ  =1 , Besley’s speciﬁcation in (7) is the same as the
‘corrected’ speciﬁcation in (4) if and only if for all z =( p,q,m) ∈ RK+2
++ ,w eh a v e
u(x(z),θy(z)) = u(x(z),θy(z)). (8)
From (2), (5), and (6), we know that both (x(z),θy(z)) and (x(z),θy(z)) satisfy
the budget equation at prices p and
q
θ; since utility function speciﬁcations guarantee a
unique optimum, we have
(8) ⇔ (x(z),θy(z)) = (x(z),θy(z)), for all z ∈ RK+2
++









= x(p,q,m),f o ra l l(p,q,m) ∈ RK+2
++ . (9)











yq1−σ, for all (p,q,m) ∈ RK+2
++ . (10)
Combining (9) and (10), we get
(8) ⇔ θσ−1 =1 ,
which leads to the desired result, given θ  =1 . 
Our claim tells us that a non-welfarist might still proceed following Besley’s lines, though
it does not leave too much room for generality. A non-welfarist might also recalculate
all formulas using the ‘corrected’ welfare speciﬁcation, but the typical non-welfarist
problem –Roy’s identity cannot be used– makes the results more diﬃcult to interpret
(see, e.g., Schroyen, 2002, who uses a ﬁrst-order approximation to interpret (ﬁrst-best)
non-welfarist commodity tax rules). This stands to reason, because the essence of non-
welfarism is to create a gap between the agents’ and government’s view on well-being.
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